Is morality objective? · Quiz question 13/35

Harman's Cat

Harman's Cat and Moral Facts

"Water is H₂O" and "torturing a cat for fun is wrong" — are they true in the same way? Gilbert Harman's cat and the debate over moral facts.

As it appears in the quiz

Here are two sentences: "Water is made of hydrogen and oxygen." And: "Tormenting a cat for fun is wrong."

The second sentence is just as "true" as the first.

Who came up with it

American philosopher Gilbert Harman introduced it in The Nature of Morality (1977). You round a corner and see young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and set it on fire. You instantly judge: that's wrong. Harman argued we don't need the fact that it really is wrong to explain that judgment — our upbringing and sensibilities are enough. That's unlike science, where observations are evidence for physical facts. Nicholas Sturgeon replied in 1985 that moral facts do figure in good explanations.

Original papers & key readings

Harman, G. (1977). The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford University Press, ch. 1.
Sturgeon, N. L. (1985). "Moral Explanations." In D. Copp & D. Zimmerman (eds.), Morality, Reason and Truth. Rowman & Allanheld, 49–78.
Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press.

What it's really asking

This question asks whether moral sentences can be "true" the way scientific ones are. If you agreed, you're on the side of moral cognitivism and realism: moral sentences describe facts, and some of them are true.

Realists split among themselves. Naturalist realists think moral facts are identical to, or made up of, natural facts like suffering and flourishing. Non-naturalists like G. E. Moore think moral properties are unique and can't be defined in natural terms. Skeptics like Harman and expressivists say the two sentences share a grammar but do different jobs: the first describes the world, the second expresses our attitude.

Where philosophers stand

Non-naturalist realism (agrees)

Moral facts are a different kind from scientific facts, but just as true.

Key names: G. E. Moore, Derek Parfit, W. D. Ross

Naturalist realism (agrees)

Moral facts rest on natural facts like suffering and flourishing, and they do explanatory work.

Key names: Sturgeon, Peter Railton, Richard Boyd

Expressivism / error theory (disagrees)

Moral sentences look like they describe facts, but they express attitudes — or presuppose properties that don't exist.

Key names: Harman, J. L. Mackie, David Hume

In the 2020 PhilPapers Survey, about 69% of philosophers chose cognitivism about moral judgment (moral sentences can be true or false).

Philosophers to check out

G. E. Moore Derek Parfit David Hume