Is morality objective? · Quiz question 18/35
Emotivism: The Boo-Hurrah Theory
Is "lying is bad" really just "ugh, lying!"? A. J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson's emotivism — the boo/hurrah theory — and the big objection to it.
Someone says, "Lying is bad."
That's really just a feeling — basically "ugh, I hate lying."
In chapter 6 of Language, Truth and Logic (1936), British philosopher A. J. Ayer proposed emotivism: moral judgments don't state facts, they only express feelings. Saying "stealing is wrong" is like saying "stealing!!" in a special tone. American philosopher Charles Stevenson developed it in 1937, adding that moral words also work to change other people's attitudes. The view is often nicknamed the "boo-hurrah theory."
Emotivism explains well why moral arguments never end and why moral judgments move us to act — beliefs alone don't make you act, but feelings and attitudes do. The idea goes back to Hume, who said "reason is the slave of the passions."
The most famous objection is the "Frege–Geach problem," pressed by Peter Geach. In "if lying is bad, then getting your brother to lie is bad," the moral sentence sits inside an "if" and expresses no feeling — yet the reasoning looks valid. How can a feeling be a premise in logical reasoning? Simon Blackburn's quasi-realism and Allan Gibbard's norm-expressivism developed expressivism into much more sophisticated forms in response.
Moral judgments don't describe the world; they express attitudes, feelings or plans.
Key names: Ayer, Stevenson, Simon Blackburn, Allan Gibbard, David Hume (forerunner)"Lying is bad" is a claim that can be true or false — the way it slots into reasoning proves it.
Key names: G. E. Moore, Derek Parfit, W. D. RossMoral sentences try to state facts, but there are no such facts, so they're all false — not feelings, not truths.
Key names: J. L. Mackie